University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology

Psychology, Department of

2013

Brain mechanisms underlying the impact of
attachment-related stress on social cognition
Tobias Nolte
Yale University, tobias.nolte@annafreud.org

Danielle Z. Bolling
Yale University

Caitlin M. Hudac
University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Peter Fonagy
University College London

Linda Mayes
Yale University
See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub
Part of the Psychology Commons
Nolte, Tobias; Bolling, Danielle Z.; Hudac, Caitlin M.; Fonagy, Peter; Mayes, Linda; and Pelphrey, Kevin A., "Brain mechanisms
underlying the impact of attachment-related stress on social cognition" (2013). Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology. 915.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/915

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.

Authors

Tobias Nolte, Danielle Z. Bolling, Caitlin M. Hudac, Peter Fonagy, Linda Mayes, and Kevin A. Pelphrey

This article is available at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/915

ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 27 November 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00816

HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE

Brain mechanisms underlying the impact of
attachment-related stress on social cognition
Tobias Nolte 1,2*, Danielle Z. Bolling 1 , Caitlin M. Hudac 3 , Peter Fonagy 2 , Linda Mayes 1 and
Kevin A. Pelphrey 1
1
2
3

Yale Child Study Center, Yale School of Medicine, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA

Edited by:
Leonhard Schilbach, University
Hospital Cologne, Germany
Reviewed by:
James A. Coan, University of
Virginia, USA
Elliot Berkman, University of
Oregon, USA
*Correspondence:
Tobias Nolte, Research Department
of Clinical, Educational and Health
Psychology, University College
London, Gower Street,
London WC1E 6BT, UK
e-mail: tobias.nolte@annafreud.org

Mentalizing, in particular the successful attribution of complex mental states to others, is
crucial for navigating social interactions. This ability is highly influenced by external factors
within one’s daily life, such as stress. We investigated the impact of stress on the brain
basis of mentalization in adults. Using a novel modification of the Reading the Mind in
the Eyes Test (RMET-R) we compared the differential effects of two personalized stress
induction procedures: a general stress induction (GSI) and an attachment-related stress
induction (ASI). Participants performed the RMET-R at baseline and after each of the two
inductions. Baseline results replicated and extended previous findings regarding the neural
correlates of the RMET-R. Additionally, we identified brain regions associated with making
complex age judgments from the same stimuli. Results after stress exposure showed that
the ASI condition resulted in reduced mentalization-related activation in the left posterior
superior temporal sulcus (STS), left inferior frontal gyrus and left temporoparietal junction
(TPJ). Moreover, the left middle frontal gyrus and left anterior insula showed greater
functional connectivity to the left posterior STS after the ASI. Our findings indicate that
attachment-related stress has a unique effect on the neural correlates of mentalization.
Keywords: mentalizing, social cognition, attachment, stress, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, bio-behavioral
switch model

INTRODUCTION
When we interact with others, we are interested not only in their
visible features; vastly more important are the beliefs, desires, and
intentions that lie behind their actions which must be inferred.
Mentalizing refers to the human ability to perceive, represent,
and reason about the intentions, beliefs, and psychological dispositions of one’s self and others, e.g., appropriately attributing
a mental state to a person’s facially expressed sadness in order to
infer their need to be comforted. The foundation for mentalizing
is partly rooted in early infant–caregiver attachment relationships and matures over the course of development with continued
interpersonal interactions (Fonagy et al., 2002, 2007; Luyten et al.,
under review). The neural system that underpins mentalizing
comprises the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporoparietal
junction (TPJ), temporal poles, superior temporal sulcus (STS),
and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)/precuneus (Gallagher and
Frith, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Frith and Frith, 2006;
Lieberman, 2007). Additional work characterizing the neural correlates of mentalization has distinguished functional subnetworks
within this system. Studies exploring neural correlates for implicit
vs. explicit social cognition (Uddin et al., 2007; de Lange et al.,
2008; Njomboro et al., 2008; Fonagy and Luyten, 2009; Pineda
and Hecht, 2009; Rameson et al., 2010; for review) support a similar juxtaposition of implicit and explicit mentalizing operations.
Indeed, implicit mentalization, defined as reflexive, automatic
processing of mental states that does not require conscious, verbal
efforts, engages the fusiform face area, STS, inferior frontal gyrus
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(IFG), and premotor areas (Allison et al., 2000; Pelphrey et al.,
2003; Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007; Iacoboni, 2009; Vander
Wyk et al., 2009). In contrast, explicit mentalization, defined as
controlled, conscious, verbal efforts to decode one’s mental states,
involves the MPFC and TPJ (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006).
Facial features, especially the eyes, convey a rich array of social
information that plays a role in both implicit and explicit mentalizing processes (Pelphrey et al., 2002; Blair, 2003). In the Reading
the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), participants are asked to infer the mental states of others from static
images depicting only the eye region. Mental state judgments
are designed to evoke mentalizing operations in the participants.
These judgments are usually compared with non-mentalizing
tasks such as judging gender from the eyes. The RMET assesses
aspects of both explicit and implicit mentalization, as it entails
effortful and conscious decoding of intentional mental states as
well as automatic processing of facial and emotionally salient
stimulus components. As expected, the RMET reliably engages
key nodes of the mentalizing system, including the MPFC, posterior STS, and IFG (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Russell et al., 2000;
Adams et al., 2009; Moor et al., 2012).
Contemporary attachment theory describes attachment as
a behavioral and physiological system that is biologically based
and dynamically adapts to meet the needs of the individual’s
particular environment (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007; Nolte
et al., 2011). Perceived threats, fear and psychosocial stress have
been shown to behaviorally activate an individual’s attachment
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system, prompting a series of brain-modulated processes that
ultimately aim to regulate the stress response by drawing on
one’s mental representations of attachment figures (i.e., parents,
romantic partners) for comfort (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007).
As an example, when one experiences interpersonal stress that
activates this attachment system, the capacity to understand
someone else’s mental state may be reduced, distorted, and less
flexible, potentially corresponding to reduced attention to social
cues (Luyten et al., under review). In line with this theory, there
is growing evidence confirming that emotional arousal and
psychosocial stress, especially when related to attachment relationships (with parents, romantic partners, close family members
in situations entailing loss, abandonment, abuse etc.), behaviorally impair both explicit and implicit mentalizing (Repacholi
and Slaughter, 2003; Moriguchi et al., 2006; Lieberman, 2007;
Fonagy and Luyten, 2009). It remains unclear which specific
characteristics of attachment-related stress underpin this interference (e.g., limited mentalizing resources due to increased
allostatic load that can no longer be deployed to thinking about
other people; (Nolte et al., 2011)). Moreover, based on Arnsten’s
(1998) dual process model, it has been proposed (Mayes, 2000,
2006) “that stress regulation involves the coordination between
different neurochemical systems that serve as multilevel gates”
for mentalizing processes (Luyten et al., submitted). Fonagy
et al. (2011) have proposed that the relationship between stress,
attachment activation and mentalization is best understood in
terms of a biobehavioral switch model, which postulates a relative
“switch from cortical to subcortical systems, from controlled to
automatic (fast and inaccuracy-prone) mentalizing and subsequently to non-mentalizing modes” of social cognition under
attachment-related stress. This is corroborated by more recent
“default-interventionist dual-process theories” (Evans, 2011; Van
Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013) describing how implicit
processing is viewed as a quick default solution to an evaluation,
which may afterwards be modulated (accepted or corrected)
by explicit reasoning. The latter, if not impaired by too much
cognitive load (Spunt and Lieberman, 2013), is conceptualized
to be a result of iterative reprocessing (Cunningham and Zelazo,
2007) via additional computation cycles passing information
back and forth between lower and higher processing levels.
In this context, the impairment in mentalizing may simply
reflect the impact of general autonomic arousal on cognitive
performance in a broader range of executive functions or
decoding processes, or it could signify a developmental origin of
mentalizing within attachment relationships that is specifically
affected during stress that involves attachment figures (Fonagy
et al., 2007, 2011). Previous research supports the latter hypothesis, as associations have been reported between childhood
parental maltreatment and impaired mentalization (Cicchetti
et al., 2003; Pears and Fisher, 2005). Based on this and related
evidence, it has been hypothesized that strong triggering of the
attachment system may be associated with a relative deactivation
of the blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) response in
brain regions underpinning the mentalizing system (Bartels and
Zeki, 2000, 2004; Mayes, 2006; Satpute and Lieberman, 2006;
Lieberman, 2007). The accuracy of mentalization inferences
in everyday social cognition may thus be prone to modulation
by the amount, but more importantly also the type of stress
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

arousal in which they occur not the level of arousal. However, it
is unclear whether stressors of different origins (i.e., general vs.
socially-based vs. specifically attachment-related stress) impact
mentalizing abilities differentially.
In this study we evaluated whether attachment-related stress,
as a particular type of interpersonal stress, had a unique effect
on mental state judgments compared with a general, noninterpersonal stressor. We expected that the different stressor
types might also have differential affects on age judgments (the
control task in the current study design), but that was not the
main focus of our hypotheses.
Although behavioral studies employing the Trier Social Stress
Test (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993) have shown that stress
affects subsequent performance on a variety of cognitive and
physiological processes (Kudielka et al., 2004, 2007; Kuhlmann
et al., 2005; Roelofs et al., 2005), the TSST was not shown to
affect performance on the RMET (Smeets et al., 2009). However,
The TSST does not operationalize stress in a truly individualized
induction paradigm based upon individually significant interpersonal life events. Rather, it applies a standardized psychosocial
stress protocol to each participant. Sinha (2009) developed
a modified paradigm to evoke personalized, stressful arousal
states in a laboratory setting. The paradigm specifically elicits
idiosyncratic stress experiences for each participant. Using this
technique, we previously provided evidence that exposure to an
attachment-related stressor affects participants’ accuracy scores
on the RMET-R, compared with performance under no stress.
After the stressor, accuracy increased in the gender-detection
control task and decreased in the mentalization task. Increases
in salivary cortisol and subjective ratings of experienced stress
post-induction also supported the validity of the procedure
(Nolte et al., submitted).
Here we sought to identify, via functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) the brain mechanisms whereby attachmentrelated stress, relative to non-attachment-related stress, may differentially compromise mentalization. Participants completed a
revised version of the RMET (RMET-R) and an age-judgment
control task three times during an fMRI scan session: (1) at
baseline, (2) after exposure to a general, non-interpersonal stress
induction, and (3) after exposure to an attachment-related, interpersonal stressor. Based upon developmental (e.g., Cicchetti
et al., 2003) and clinical research (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009), we
hypothesized that re-experiencing an attachment-related, interpersonal (vs. a general, non-interpersonal) stressful life event
would have a greater negative impact on the behavioral and neural correlates of mentalization, as indicated by reduced levels of
activity within the nodes of the mentalizing network and altered
patterns of functional connectivity among the nodes.

METHODS
PARTICIPANTS

Eighteen healthy adult participants (nine male, all right-handed)
were recruited via a graduate school volunteer system and completed this study. The majority of participants were undergraduate students; three worked as research assistants but were naïve
to the study. The mean age was 20.9 years (SD = 1.44 years) and
age ranged between 18 and 23 years. Participants were screened
for MRI eligibility and against any psychiatric disorders using
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the Brief Symptoms Inventory (Derogatis, 1993). One participant was excluded for having head motion drift greater than
3 mm or degrees from position at the first volume acquisition
during the functional scan. For one participant, the first block
of the ASI condition was cut out due to an isolated period of
motion. Two additional participants were excluded for failing
to respond during the task for more than six consecutive trials
(one full condition block). After these exclusions, 15 participants
remained for analysis (eight male) with a mean age of 20.73
years (SD = 1.20), range 18–23 years. All participants gave written informed consent to participate in this protocol, which was
approved by Yale University’s Human Investigations Committee,
and were compensated $50 for their participation.

order to enhance the re-experience of their selected events and
to render scripts as ecologically valid as possible, participants
also chose from a list of physical reactions to stress that reflected
their bodily sensations at the time of the event (e.g., “There is
a sinking feeling in my chest”). Scripts were then edited following a semi-standardized procedure (Sinha, 2005) and recorded by
the same female person, yielding personalized induction imagery
scripts of about 5 min in length. Scores for subjective stress experience (Wolpe, 1969) were obtained again at the beginning of
the debriefing after scanning and showed no difference in mean
scores when comparing both stress conditions in a paired samples
t-test [t(14) = 1.07, p = 0.34].
Measurement of social cognition

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Stress inductions—creation of imagery scripts

The procedure was modified from an established paradigm tested
in addiction and stress research (Sinha et al., 1999; Sinha, 2005;
Chaplin et al., 2008). Two induction imagery scripts were created for each individual in a visit prior to scanning, with the aim
of creating individually tailored, personally meaningful arousal
states (Sinha et al., 1999; Sinha, 2005). Participants were asked
to recall stressful events that had occurred to them during the
past 12 months, both stressful events that were attachmentrelated (i.e., involving a significant other) and stressful events
that were general (non-interpersonal) in nature. In this way,
two types of inductions were created: attachment-related stress
inductions (ASI) and general stress inductions (GSI). For ASI,
participants were asked: “Please think of a stressful interpersonal
situation with people very significant to you that left you feeling
mad, sad, and upset and where you felt helpless and emotionally
overwhelmed.” Common themes included relationships ending,
attending a relative’s funeral or having to move out of the parental
home. These specific situations, according to attachment theory (e.g., Bowlby, 1982; George and West, 2001) are not only
social in nature but are additionally characterized by the fact that
the involved other is relevant and salient to set the individual’s
attachment system in motion. If a provided narrative did not fit
these criteria further probing was used until appropriate material was given. For GSI, participants were asked: “Please think of
a stressful situation that left you feeling mad, sad, and upset and
where you felt helpless and emotionally overwhelmed that did not
involve another person significant to you.” Common themes here
included the crucial period of preparation for final exams, the loss
of an important object such as a wallet with all its contents, or
missing a flight.1
All participants rated their perceived stress on a 10-point
Likert scale where scores from 1 (not at all stressful) to 10 (the
most stress they had felt recently in their life) were applied to evaluate the provided vignette (Wolpe, 1969). For both induction
types, only situations rated 8 or above on the perceived stress
scale were accepted as appropriate for script development. In
1 By

implication, in most cases other people were referenced in these scripts
so that they were not strictly non-social but stories were excluded if the other
persons could be viewed as significant others to the participant in line with
attachment theory.
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The experimental task was based on the RMET (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001), a task in which participants are asked to match
static grayscale images of emotionally expressive human eyes to
a corresponding mental state label. In this study, participants
performed a revised version of this task (RMET-R) whereby the
original gender-attribution control task was replaced by judgments about displayed age (Figure A1). This modification was
implemented in order to increase the difficulty of the control task,
rendering it more comparable to the experimental task. Further,
to allow for stimulus processing within the desired presentation
time, only two out of the original four labels were retained (one
being the target, the other one a foil), and age choices were written as words rather than numerals to ensure lexical similarity.
Additional stimuli (Nolte et al., submitted) were created to obtain
a sufficient trial number (72 images in total). The experiment
comprised the collection of three functional runs all within the
same scan session (baseline, post-GSI, post-ASI), referred to as
conditions. In each condition blocks alternated between mental state and age judgment tasks (four blocks of each task, eight
blocks in total) with a 12 s fixation cross between blocks. The
total duration per condition was 4.6 min. In each block, six trials
were performed in which stimuli were shown for 3500 ms followed by 500 ms of fixation after each stimulus presentation. In
each condition, different stimuli were shown in order to minimize potential practice effects due to repeated exposure and each
stimulus had to be judged twice, once for age, once for mental
state.
Both RMET-R stimuli and auditory inductions (during which
participants were asked to close their eyes) were presented
using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychological Software Tools, Inc.,
Pittsburgh, PA). All participants completed three functional runs
(conditions) of the RMET-R task: an initial baseline measurement, which was used to identify the neural network subserving
RMET-R-elicited mentalization, one following the GSI, and one
following the ASI. The presentation order of induction type was
balanced between participants in order to control for carry-over
effects so that half of them re-experienced a GSI first and the other
half re-experienced an ASI first.
MRI DATA ACQUISITION

Scanning was performed on a Siemens 3T TIM Trio scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) at the Magnetic Resonance
Research Center, Yale University School of Medicine. T1-weighted
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anatomical images were acquired using an MPRAGE sequence
(TR = 2530 ms; TE = 3.34 ms; FOV = 25.6 cm; image matrix =
642 ; 1 × 1 × 1 mm). For 11 participants, in each RMET-R
run, 156 whole-brain functional images were acquired using a
single-shot, gradient-recalled echo planar pulse sequence (TR =
2000 ms; TE = 25 ms; flip angle = 60◦ ; FOV = 22 cm; image
matrix = 642 ; voxel size = 3.2 × 3.2 × 3.2 mm; 34 slices) sensitive to BOLD contrast. For the remaining four participants, each
RMET-R run consisted of 154 whole-brain functional images
acquired in the same manner. This two-volume discrepancy was
due to a scanner operator inconsistency, and did not overlap with
data acquisition during the presentation of task stimuli.
DATA ANALYSIS

Behavior

For 13 of the 18 participants (including those removed from fMRI
analyses), behavioral data including percentage of correct mental state and age judgment responses and mental state and age
judgment reaction times were recorded during the scan. The data
from the two participants who failed to respond to six or more
consecutive trials were not included in behavioral analyses. In
addition, behavioral data from three participants were lost to software errors. Age-judgment accuracy was calculated on the basis of
norm data from an external population of 13 students, age range
22–31 years (SD = 2.61). The cut-off for determining correct
responses was 60% consensus between participants. For 12 out of
the 72 stimuli no such consensus was established and those stimuli were excluded from accuracy and reaction time analyses. We
performed four within-participant repeated measures ANOVAs
comparing the three task conditions (baseline, post-GSI, postASI) for differences in both correct responses and reaction times,
for mental state and age judgments separately. Post-hoc paired
samples t-tests were performed to compare mean accuracy and
average reaction times for mental state judgments between each
condition.
MRI

Data were analyzed with Brain Voyager QX version 2.0.8 (Brain
Innovation, Maastricht, Netherlands). The three volumes prior
to the onset of the first stimulus event were discarded to allow
for T1 equilibrium. Preprocessing of the functional data included
interleaved slice time correction using cubic spline interpolation, three-dimensional motion correction using trilinear/sinc
interpolation, linear trend removal, temporal smoothing with a
Gaussian FWHM of 2.8 s, and temporal high-pass filtering with
Fourier basis set, using three cycles per time course. Upon examination of estimated motion plots and cine loops, one participant
was excluded due to greater than 3.0 mm (or degrees) deviation or
rotation from the initial estimated center of mass in any direction.
Functional datasets were co-registered to within-session anatomical images, which were in turn normalized to Talairach space. On
a single-participant level, general linear model (GLM) analyses
were performed by defining two task predictors as boxcar functions with values of 1 during experimental blocks (mental state or
age) and 0 otherwise, and convolving each of these task predictors
with a double-gamma hemodynamic response function. The two
task predictors, as well as motion predictors depicting movement
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in each of the three translations and three rotations were included
in each single-participant GLM, with the task functions as the
only predictors of interest. For each participant, three distinct
GLM analyses were performed on the functional data collected
during the RMET-R: baseline, post-GSI, and post-ASI.
To identify the network of regions subserving mentalization
during the RMET-R, a multi-participant random-effects GLM
analysis was performed on functional data obtained at baseline
(with no prior stressor) by comparing activation during mental
state judgments to activation during age judgments. Patterns of
differential activation were identified at a voxel-wise false discovery rate (Genovese et al., 2002) threshold of q < 0.05 with only
clusters of four or more contiguous functional voxels displayed.
A group-level activation mask was created from the initial
baseline run to investigate stressor-related differences in mentalization activation specifically within regions modulated by the
RMET-R. A region-of-interest mask was created from regions differentially active in mental state vs. age judgments in the baseline
RMET-R run at the threshold q < 0.05. Subsequently, activation
in each of the two judgment conditions in the RMET-R poststressor (GSI and ASI) was assessed by performing two multiparticipant random-effects GLM analyses (one per stressor) using
the mask created from the task analysis at baseline. Whole-brain
volume maps of activation were created for each participant for
the mental state and age judgment conditions separately in each
of the post-stressor RMET-R runs. Within each judgment type,
activation during the RMET-R post-GSI was subtracted from
activation during the RMET-R post-ASI. This subtraction was
done for each participant and the differences were compared to
zero, constituting a voxel-wise paired-sample t-test. This allowed
us to look at task-related regions that were differentially activated
depending on the stressor (GSI or ASI) in mental state and age
judgments separately. These results were assessed at a statistical
threshold of p < 0.05, with a cluster threshold of four functional
voxels, as the number of voxel-wise comparisons being made was
already restricted by the functional mask. The functional mask
left only voxels for which our hypothesis predicted modulation
by stress induction. For this reason, we chose a very liberal cluster
threshold to explore all possible stress modulations. Alternatively,
when we used a cluster threshold estimator based on 1000 MonteCarlo simulations, 13 voxels was estimated to correspond to an
α < 0.05 for the stressor comparisons of both age and mental
state judgments. This calculated cluster threshold only eliminates
the significance of the result in left IFG.
Furthermore, a modified psychophysiological interaction
(PPI) analysis (Friston et al., 1997) was performed on each
RMET-R dataset to determine regions of greater functional connectivity in mental state vs. age judgments to a functionallydefined region of the left posterior STS that showed greater
activation to mental state (vs. age) judgments in the current
study (peak coordinate −51, −34, 1; 3674 1 mm3 voxels). Prior to
the connectivity analyses, the global mean (average signal across
voxels) was removed from each volume as a surrogate method
for physiological artifact removal (Fox et al., 2005). A randomeffects whole-brain GLM analysis identified a left posterior STS
region (136 functional voxels) with greater activation to mental state vs. age judgments during the baseline RMET-R. Using
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this functionally defined seed region, PPI regressors for each
judgment type were created separately by multiplying the hemodynamic response function-convolved task regressor for each
judgment type by the preprocessed and normalized left posterior STS time course for each participant. This PPI function along
with the task predictors and left posterior STS time course were
used as regressors in a multi-participant random-effects GLM
analysis in each RMET-R run for each judgment type. The PPI
function was used as the only predictor of interest. For each of
the two post-stressor RMET-R runs, whole-brain volume maps
were created for each participant, modeling the PPI predictor
for both mental state judgments and age judgments separately.
As described in the functional activation analysis, a whole-brain
voxel-wise paired t-test was performed to contrast differential
functional connectivity post-GSI vs. post-ASI for each type of
judgment (age and mental state). This contrast allowed us to
define regions that showed greater functional connectivity to the
left posterior STS in the task post-ASI compared with post-GSI.
This comparison of functional connectivity was made separately
for mental state judgments and age judgments. The two contrasts
were assessed at a threshold of p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons with a cluster threshold of 34 functional voxels
(Forman et al., 1995; Xiong et al., 1995). This cluster threshold was determined using the Brain Voyager QX Cluster-level
Statistical Threshold Estimator plugin to correspond to a wholebrain corrected threshold of α < 0.05. After 1000 iterations of a
Monte-Carlo simulation, an alpha value is assigned to each cluster
size based on its relative frequency.

RESULTS

Four within-participants repeated measures ANOVAs comparing the three task conditions for differences in both correct
responses and reaction times were performed for mental state
and age judgments separately (see Table 1). For age judgments,
this analysis did not yield significant differences for either correct responses or reaction times. Results of the ANOVA for
mental state judgments indicated significant differences between
task conditions for correct responses (F = 3.59, p = 0.04) and
reaction times [F(2, 24) = 10.13, p = 0.01].
Post-hoc paired samples comparisons for correct responses in
mental state judgments indicated that there were significant differences in the percentage of correct responses between baseline
and post-ASI [t(12) = 2.30, p < 0.05] and between post-GSI and
post-ASI [t(12) = 2.20, p < 0.05] with highest accuracy at baseline and lowest post-ASI. Post-hoc t-tests for reaction times during
mental state judgments revealed significant differences between
baseline and post-GSI [t(12) = 4.12, p < 0.01] and between baseline and post-ASI [t(12) = 3.65, p < 0.01] with longest reaction
times at baseline and shortest reaction times post-ASI.
fMRI

We identified a network of brain regions that responds differentially to age and mental state judgments during the RMET-R
in the absence of any pre-task stress induction (Figure 1). Peak
coordinates, effect-size values, size, and anatomical labels for the
regions of differential activation between the two judgment types
are displayed in Table 2.
As illustrated in Figure 1, regions that showed increased
activation during mental state judgments at baseline included
bilateral IFG (right: t = 6.75, p < 0.0001; left: t = 10.04, p <

BEHAVIOR

The mean percentages of correct responses and reaction times
in each task are displayed in Table 1. Mean percentages of correct responses [t(12) = 0.21, p = 0.84] and reaction times [t(12) =
1.89, p = 0.08] comparing mental state and age judgments at
baseline did not differ significantly.
Table 1 | Within-participant repeated measures ANOVAs comparing
three task conditions for differences in correct responses and
reaction times.
Variable

Baseline

Post-GSI

Post-ASI

mean (SD)

mean (SD)

mean (SD)

F (2, 24)

P

MS CR

74.70 (6.05)

74.98 (8.60)

MS RT

2187 (289)

2075 (283)

67.03 (10.00)

3.59

0.04

2008 (220)

10.13

Age CR

73.85 (11.57)

0.01

74.62 (14.06)

73.85 (11.39)

0.04

0.97

Age RT

2102 (244)

2038 (215)

1998 (317)

1.28

0.20

Abbreviations: MS, mental state judgments; age, age judgments; CR, percentage of correct responses; RT, reaction times in milliseconds; GSI, general stress
induction; ASI, attachment stress induction. Post-hoc paired samples comparisons for CR in MS: significant differences in CR between baseline and post-ASI
[t(12) = 2.30, p < 0.05] and between post-GSI and post-ASI [t(12) = 2.20, p <
0.05] with highest CR at baseline and lowest post-ASI. Post-hoc t-tests for RT
during MS: significant differences between baseline and post-GSI [t(12) = 4.12, p
< 0.01] and between baseline and post-ASI [t(12) = 3.65, p < 0.01] with longest

FIGURE 1 | Regions differentially activated by mental state and age
judgments in the RMET-R administered with no previous stress
induction. Regions in orange showed more activation to mental state
judgments, while regions in blue showed more activation to age judgments
(random-effects GLM, q < 0.05, k = 4). Data is interpolated to 1 mm3
resolution for presentation.

reaction times at baseline and RT times post-ASI.
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0.0001), right posterior STS (t = 5.43, p < 0.0001), left posterior insula (t = 7.16, p < 0.0001), right middle temporal gyrus
(t = 5.73, p < 0.0001), left superior temporal gyrus (t = 8.18,
p < 0.0001), and left middle and posterior STS (middle: t =
6.55, p < 0.0001; posterior: t = 8.56, p < 0.0001). Additional
regions that were more active during mental state judgments
included the left parahippocampal gyrus (t = 5.85, p < 0.0001)
and dorsoMPFC (t = 6.51, p < 0.0001).
Table 2 | Activation in RMET-R at baseline.
X

Y

Z

Size

t

p

MENTAL STATE > AGE JUDGMENTS
Right pSTS

54 −31

1

156

5.43 <0.001

Right IFG

51

1

388

6.75 <0.001

19

134

7.16 <0.001

1

177

5.73 <0.001

−11

849

8.18 <0.001

−2

192

6.55 <0.001

Left posterior insula
Right MTG

26

−39 −43
48 −52

Left STG

−51

Left mSTS

−54 −16

Left pSTS

−51 −34

8

Left parahippocampal gyrus −42 −16
Left IFG

−51

DMPFC

−9

26
−4

1

3674

8.56 <0.001

−14

203

5.85 <0.001

7

1410

10.04 <0.001

55

517

6.51 <0.001
−11.76 <0.001

AGE > MENTAL STATE JUDGMENTS
Right IPL

39 −49

40

9259

Right MFG

39

19

240

−5.92 <0.001

PCC/precuneus

6

−34

31 13822

−10.14 <0.001

Right DLPFC

30

5

46

2297

−6.19 <0.001

Right ITG

60 −37 −11

1753

−9.72 <0.001

29

Left IPL

−39 −55

43

4153

−7.73 <0.001

Left cerebellum

−33 −55 −35

491

−8.39 <0.001

Regions identified in a whole-brain contrast of mental state and age judgments.
Talairach coordinates and statistics refer to the voxel with the maximum signal
change in each region of interest. Abbreviations: pSTS, posterior superior temporal sulcus; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; MTG, middle temporal gyrus; STG, superior
temporal gyrus; mSTS, middle superior temporal sulcus; DMPFC, dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; DLPFC,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus.

FIGURE 2 | Left: Regions that showed differential activation between
mental state and age judgments in the baseline RMET-R that were
modulated by stress induction type during mental state judgments.
Right: Regions that showed differential activation between mental state and
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Regions that showed more activation to age judgments
included bilateral inferior parietal lobules (right: t = −11.76,
p < 0.0001; left: t = −7.73, p < 0.0001), right middle frontal
gyrus (MFG; t = −5.92, p < 0.0001), PCC extending into
precuneus (t = −10.14, p < 0.0001), right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (t = −6.19, p < 0.0001), right inferior temporal
gyrus (t = −9.72, p < 0.0001), and left cerebellum (t = −8.39,
p < 0.0001).
When we compared activation during mental state judgments
between the two types of stress inductions in the identified taskrelated areas, we localized regions that were more active during
mental state judgments after the GSI compared with the ASI.
These regions included the left IFG (t = −2.93, p < 0.05), left
posterior STS (t = −5.02, p < 0.001), and left temporal parietal
junction (t = −4.83, p < 0.001). Thus, post-ASI, activation in
these three regions decreased significantly in comparison to postGSI. There were no regions that were more active during mental
state judgments after the ASI compared with the GSI.
The same analysis within age judgments identified only one
region that was more active during age judgments after the GSI
compared with the ASI: the left TPJ (t = −5.08, p < 0.001).
Again, no regions were more active during age judgments after the
ASI compared with the GSI. Results of the comparison between
stress inductions within age and mental state judgments are displayed in Figure 2. Peak coordinates, effect-size values, size, and
anatomical labels for the regions of differential activation between
the two stress inductions are displayed in Table 3.
When we compared functional connectivity to the
functionally-defined left posterior STS during mental state
judgments after the two stress inductions, regions that showed
greater functional connectivity to the left posterior STS after
the ASI included the left MFG (t = 4.90, p < 0.001) and left
anterior insula (AI; t = 5.24, p < 0.001). No regions were more
functionally connected to the left posterior STS during mental
state judgments post-GSI.
Exploring differential connectivity to the left posterior STS
during age judgments revealed several regions that differed
between the two stress inductions. The cuneus showed increased
functional connectivity to the left posterior STS following the

age judgments in the baseline RMET-R that were modulated by stress
induction type during age judgments. Regions in blue reflect decreased
activation post-ASI compared with post-GSI (masked voxel-wise paired t-test,
p < 0.05, k = 4). Data is interpolated to 1 mm3 resolution for presentation.
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Table 3 | Activation during mental state judgments and age
judgments post-ASI vs. post-GSI.
X

Y

Z

Size

t

p

MENTAL STATE JUDGMENTS
Left IFG

−45

29

11

137

−2.93

Left pSTS

−54

−46

3

1539

−5.02

<0.001

Left TPJ

−57

−40

22

490

−4.83

<0.001

−43

22

359

−5.08

<0.001

0.011*

AGE JUDGMENTS
Left TPJ

−56

Regions identified in a paired t-test (within voxels showing differential activation to mental state and age judgments during the RMET-R at baseline) to
show differential activation post-ASI vs. post-GSI for each judgment type (mental state and age). *Left IFG did not survive cluster correction to α < 0.05.
Abbreviations: IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; pSTS, posterior superior temporal
sulcus; TPJ, temporoparietal junction.

ASI compared with the GSI (t = 3.78, p < 0.01). Bilateral AI
(right: t = −3.94, p < 0.01; left: t = −5.66, p < 0.001), right
middle temporal gyrus extending into parahippocampal gyrus
and fusiform gyrus (t = −5.37, p < 0.001), right dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (t = −6.28, p < 0.001), and left fusiform gyrus
(t = −4.58, p < 0.001) were more functionally connected to the
left posterior STS during age judgments post-GSI vs. post-ASI.
Results of the two connectivity analyses are displayed in Figure 3.
Peak coordinates, effect-size values, size, and anatomical labels
for the regions of differential connectivity between the two stress
inductions are displayed in Table 4.

DISCUSSION
Our results provide three important contributions. First, we
replicated fMRI findings with the RMET using a more complex control task. Second, we identified differences in stressinduced modulation of brain activation during age and mental
state judgments based on the nature of the stressor (attachmentrelated vs. general). Third, and importantly, we demonstrated
that interpersonal contextual factors, specifically the activation
of an attachment-specific stress system (compared with a more
general stress response system), uniquely modulates the functioning of brain mechanisms involved in mentalizing. Each of
these aspects will be discussed below as well as limitations of the
study.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF THE REVISED RMET

The results obtained from the RMET-R at baseline replicated
findings from previous studies on the neural processes underpinning mental state decoding operationalized with the RMET
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Russell et al., 2000; Adams et al., 2009).
Regions previously implicated in mentalization that showed
increased activation during mental state judgments in the present
study included bilateral IFG, right posterior STS, right middle
temporal gyrus, left superior temporal gyrus, and left middle and
posterior STS. Additional regions found to be more active during mental state judgments included the left posterior insula, left
parahippocampal gyrus and dorsoMPFC. Overall, these results

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

FIGURE 3 | Differential functional connectivity to the left posterior STS
during mental state and age judgments after the ASI vs. the GSI.
Regions in orange showed greater functional connectivity to the left
posterior STS during judgments post-ASI. Regions in blue showed greater
functional connectivity to the left posterior STS during judgments post-GSI
(p < 0.05, k = 34). The seed region for the connectivity analysis (shown in
purple) was defined by greater activation to mental state judgments
compared with age judgments in the RMET-R at baseline. Data is
interpolated to 1 mm3 resolution for presentation.

Table 4 | Differential functional connectivity during mental state and
age judgments post-ASI vs. post-GSI, using a seed region of the left
posterior STS defined by differential activation to mental state and
age judgments in the baseline RMET-R.
X

Y

MENTAL STATE JUDGMENTS
ASI > GSI
Left anterior insula
−24
14
Left MFG
−36
41
AGE JUDGMENTS
ASI > GSI
Cuneus
9
−79
GSI > ASI
Right anterior insula
48
8
Left anterior insula
−48
11
Right MTG/PHG/FFG
42
−28
Right dorsal ACC
21
−13
Left FFG
−39
−43

Z

Size

t

p

−8
25

6495
939

5.24
4.90

43

942

3.78

0.0020

−2
10
−8
37
−23

980
1042
5679
1068
928

−3.94
−5.66
−5.37
−6.28
−4.58

0.0015
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

<0.001
<0.001

Regions identified in a whole-brain voxel-wise paired t-test to show differential
functional connectivity to left posterior STS post-ASI vs. post-GSI for each judgment type (mental state and age). Abbreviations: MFG, middle frontal gyrus;
MTG, middle temporal gyrus; PHG, parahippocampal gyrus; FFG, fusiform gyrus;
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex.
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suggest that when performing our extended version of the revised
RMET with a modified control task, the previously established
mentalization neural network is engaged.
AGE JUDGMENTS

The control task allowed the delineation of a network of brain
areas involved in making age judgments. To date, this important
component of social information processing using neuroimaging
has been investigated with relatively few tasks (e.g., Harris and
Fiske, 2007; Winston et al., 2007; Moor et al., 2012). We asked
participants to choose between two age attributions (but, for consistency, displayed the ages as words rather than numbers) in
a task similar to the RMET-R. Regions activated in response to
age judgments as presented in this study included bilateral intraparietal lobules extending into the intraparietal sulcus, as well as
the right MFG, PCC extending into the precuneus, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right inferior temporal gyrus, and left
cerebellum. Previous findings on numerical processing (Dehaene
et al., 2003; Cantlon et al., 2006; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007;
Santens et al., 2009) have highlighted the role of the intraparietal
sulcus for both non-symbolic numerical abilities and symbolic
numerical processing.
ATTACHMENT-RELATED STRESS AND MENTALIZING

We hypothesized a differential effect of stress induction type (ASI
vs. GSI) on behavioral performance and on the neural system
for mentalizing. In line with our main prediction, we found significantly reduced accuracy scores and reduced reaction times,
specifically after ASI. This decrease is unlikely to be attributable
to fatigue as we did not find order effects for the stress types.
Moreover, we found reduced activity in three brain regions
during the mental state task after experiencing the stressor
that contained attachment-related life events. Attachment-related
stress compared with a general stress resulted in differential activity during mental state decoding in the left posterior STS, TPJ,
and IFG. In contrast, there was a significant difference between
the effects of stress induction types on modulation of activity during age judgments only in the left TPJ. Additionally, differential
functional connectivity to the left posterior STS during both tasks
post-ASI, compared with post-GSI, corroborated the hypothesis
that attachment-related stress uniquely alters the engagement of
brain networks involved in mentalizing.
The results confirmed that re-experiencing attachment-related
stress specifically interferes with both behavioral performance
and with the functioning of brain regions associated with mentalizing in a sample of healthy young adults. This provides support
for Fonagy and Luyten’s model (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009; Nolte
et al., 2011; Luyten et al., under review), which proposes that
stress-induced affective states compromise social cognition in the
context of intimate relationships. Indeed, reduced accuracy and
the reduction in activation of areas underpinning mentalization
might be related to the setting in motion of the behavioral attachment system (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007). Our findings lend
preliminary support to the biobehavioral switch model Fonagy
et al. (2011) as participants make post-ASI judgments that are
faster but at the cost of more errors which is in line with reflexive,
“jumping to conclusion” responses. Future research may address
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what direction the reduced accuracy in the RMET task takes, e.g.,
a shift toward more error-prone inference regarding negative or
less ambiguous stimuli.
On a neural level, our findings are, furthermore, indicative of
a substantial reduction in activation during mental state judgments, due to attachment-related stress. This reduction in activation occurred in several regions of the core neural system that
integrates controlled, effortful (explicit) and automatic, reflexive
(implicit) mentalization (the TPJ, IFG, and STS). This calls for
further investigations of the role of contextual manipulations of
basic social cognitive processes as the neural mechanisms of iterative reprocessing and the computational rendering of implicit to
explicit processing modes remain unclear (Spunt and Lieberman,
2013; Van Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013). Attachmentrelated stress also significantly modulated activation during age
judgments, but only in one region of the mentalizing network we
identified (TPJ), and without significant behavioral changes.
Our identification of differential effects of attachment-related
and general stress on activation of the mentalization network in
mental state judgments is complemented by PPI analyses showing
different patterns of functional connectivity to the left posterior STS in each of these conditions. Specifically, a dissociable
pattern of functional connectivity was found in the AI. During
mental state judgments, functional connectivity between the left
posterior STS and left AI increased post-ASI compared with postGSI. In contrast, during age judgments, functional connectivity
between the left posterior STS and bilateral AI decreased post-ASI
compared with post-GSI. The AI has been associated with subjective awareness (Craig, 2009) and emotion processing (Critchley
et al., 2005; Hennenlotter et al., 2005; Jabbi et al., 2007), and
has been suggested to hold a key role in empathy (for review,
see Singer et al., 2009). Further, along with the MFG (which
was also found in the present study to show increased functional
connectivity with the left posterior STS during mental state judgments post-ASI), AI has been shown to be preferentially active
in difficult vs. easy moral judgments (Greene et al., 2004). While
our aforementioned results showed that left posterior STS activation is compromised following the attachment-related stressor,
increased temporal coupling with the AI and MFG post-ASI is
in line with decreased performance accuracy after experiencing
attachment-related stress. In contrast, decreased temporal coupling of the left posterior STS and AI during age judgments
post-ASI supports the specificity of this hypothesis to mentalization processes. Taken together with the decrease in functional
connectivity between the left posterior STS and bilateral fusiform
gyrus during age judgments post-ASI, the identified pattern of
functional connectivity to the left posterior STS during age judgments post-ASI (compared with post-GSI) implies a dissociation
of the left posterior STS from brain regions subserving both
lower level face processing (fusiform gyrus) and higher level
empathic processes (AI), potentially reflecting a shift toward nonmentalization as hypothesized within the biobehavioral switch
model.
LIMITATIONS

Several limitations in the current study have to be taken into
account. First, for a non-clinical sample, 15 participants may be
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considered a relatively small sample size. Further, behavioral analyses were limited to only 13 participants, 12 of which overlapped
with the fMRI group. While we are confident in our interpretations of the presented data, the small number of participants
with fMRI and behavioral data (12) occluded the possibility of
performing direct investigations of correlations between behavioral responses and fMRI data. A larger sample size would also
allow for the investigation of gender differences in the observed
neural processes. Although our results do not provide direct evidence regarding a link between neural and behavioral findings,
previous work has established reliable relationships between the
behavioral performance of the RMET and its neural correlates
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Russell et al., 2000; Adams et al., 2009;
Moor et al., 2012). Moreover, limitations related to the age task
should be addressed in future studies by using a task for which
the difficulty or cognitive load between task and control task can
be quantified better.
Second, there are limitations due to the lack of diversity in
the specific sample investigated. Future research should assess the
neural processes at the focus of the current study in populations
more ethnically and developmentally diverse to allow for generalizability. Finally, even though we were specifically interested in
the subjective experience of distress, we do not provide evidence
for alterations of psychophysiological indices such as heart rate
variability or cortisol levels associated with the different stress
conditions. These may enhance the understanding of the differential effect of ASI and GSI on neural processes. While we took
efforts to match the inductions on the level of induced stress,
we do not have data that speak to the simultaneous induction
of other emotions and underpinning neural networks that may
have occurred with more intensity during ASI (such as fear, anger,
sadness, or a complex combination thereof). However, the ability
of attachment-related stressors to induce other emotions is not a
confound, but a potential means by which this particular type of
stressor induces its unique effects on cognition and mentalization.
Whilst theory-driven, the current study compared attachmentrelated stress as a specific case of interpersonal stress with a
more GSI. Although there is some evidence from behavioral studies that suggests otherwise, future studies need to investigate
whether other social stressors are salient enough to elicit compromised mentalizing performance (a general social script effect)
or whether this is uniquely due to the attachment aspect. With the
current design it is also undecided whether the behavioral effects
(faster and less accurate) are specifically related to the negative
social scripts or whether positive social scripts might have yielded
similar priming responses. Furthermore, future studies will have
to disentangle whether the differential stress effects reported are
more generally due to the difference between their social vs. nonsocial nature and whether individual differences in attachment
may moderate the impairment in mentalizing (e.g., Vrtička and
Vuilleumier, 2012).
CONCLUSION

In sum, using a novel modification of the RMET, we identified
the left posterior STS and left IFG as brain regions that were
modulated by attachment stressors during mental state judgments accompanying compromised behavioral performance, as
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well as the left TPJ, which showed an effect of stressor type during
both mental state and age judgments. This finding follows behavioral work showing the specific effects of attachment-related stress
on mentalizing, and thus suggests a neurobiological basis by
which these effects likely occur. This development is important
for the future elucidation of transient and interpersonal factors that can influence behavioral and neural correlates of social
cognition in healthy populations, and particularly in relation to
psychopathologies with impaired mentalizing. In addition, these
results provide a more detailed understanding of the effects of
stress on social cognition, suggesting that factors including the
nature of the stressor and the type of social reasoning interact in
meaningful ways to shape neural correlates of social cognition.
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APPENDIX

FIGURE A1 | Examples of single trials. (A) emotion recognition task; (B)
control task, age judgments.

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

www.frontiersin.org

November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 816 | 12

